WOAH SRR-SEA capacity building on risk analysis for transboundary animal disease control purposes in Southeast Asia



# UNIT 6 EN RISK PATHWAYS

Australian Government

Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry

Department of Emerging diseases and Global health

Animal Health Research Centre (CISA)

Institute for Agronomic and Food Research (INIA)

Spain's Research Council (CSIC)


Contact: <u>martinez.marta@inia.csic.es</u>





## Risk pathway for TADs control


How an infection/disease "moves" from a source ot a receptor







# Risk pathway for TADs control



#### **Recall Unit 2**

Assessment of the infection situation

- how much infection
- how fast it spreads

#### Likelihood a 'potential source' is infected

#### **Potential sources:**



Contaminated feed, equipment, transport



Contaminated water, environment



Infected animals

















Roaming/ wild animals


Very important to frame the RA question: WHAT, WHEN, HOW





# Risk pathway for TADs control


How an infection/disease "moves" from a source to a receptor



# Risk pathway for TADs control

How an infection/disease "moves" from a source to a receptor

Likelihood the "potential source" remains infectious



## **Transmission routes**





#### **Direct contact**

- Wild boar movements
- Live pig trade



#### Indirect contact:

contaminated trucks



#### **Products:**

- Product trade
- Waste food
- Contaminated water





## Framing the RA question

What is the risk of entry of ASF in a free area?






What is the risk of entry of ASF through online trade of pork products in a free area for the next Chinese New Year?








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
Building the scenario tree, <u>considering all the what-ifs</u> is far more important than the final probability risk value.

What other branches can you think of in the above RA question?

Feedback: probability that FMDV continues to be infectious





















Final Outcome	Probability	
No ASF Introduction (P(O1))	27.4%	
ASF Entry Without an Outbreak (P(O2))	12.3%	
ASF Outbreak (P(O3))	5.3%	


#### **INTERPRETATION:**

This suggests that while the likelihood of an outbreak is relatively low (5.3%), there is a notable risk (12.3%) of ASF virus entering without causing an outbreak. Meanwhile, the highest probability (27.4%) corresponds to scenarios where no ASF introduction occurs.









FMD survival data in different products: scientific articles, research studies

Guidelines on FMD risk management for pork imports (WOAH, FAO, EUFMD...) and health regulations specifying required processing levels




Industry reports from key product exporters, particularly if they trade online











## **Customs seizures reports:**

enforcement data, Interpol or other international sources



**Scientific studies** on detection efficiency of smuggled products




**Expert judgement** customs and animal health officers











**Consumer or biosecurity surveys:** enforcement data, Interpol or other international sources



Risk assessment based on geospatial data (distance from animals to potential food sources), past FMD outbreaks...







## When exact data is not available....




**EXPERT** elicitation

(Hoffman et al., 1995; O'Hagan et al., 2006)



Monte Carlo SIMULATIONS of different scenarios (ie. @RISK software)



BAYESIAN inference, combining existing data with expert opinion







## **Uncertainties**

Natural randomness (i.e. variability in detection rates)

We don't know or we don't have enough data to know with a degree of certainty (i.e. unknown volumen illegal pork trade)





#### A. CONFIDENCE SCORING


Low Uncertainty (High Confidence) → Strong data, multiple sources agree Moderate Uncertainty → Some missing data, limited studies.

High Uncertainty (Low Confidence) → Lack of reliable data, conflicting information.

#### Risk level

	LOW	MODERATE	HIGH	
Low uncertainty (high confidence)	Low concern	Monitor	Action needed	
Medium uncertainty	Monitor	Caution	Precautionary control	
High uncertainty (low confidence)	Data gap	Precautionary approach	Urgent action	IN

## **B. EXPERT ELICITATION**



- Delphi Method → Multiple rounds of anonymous expert feedback until a consensus is reached.
- Pairwise Comparison → Experts rank risk factors in relative importance.
- Nominal Group Technique (NGT) →
   Structured discussions where experts vote on risk levels.

Example of pairwise comparison:

Ask a group of expert to vote, then choose the option with higher votes


Illegal trade is...than legal trade

- a) More important
- b) Equally important
- c) Less important





## **C. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS**



- Scenario analysis → Best-case, worst-case, most likely.
- Threshold analysis → Identify key risk factors, that, if changed, would alter risk classification

Example of qualitative sensitivity analysis:

If **customs detection efficiency** is highly uncertain, analyze how **different assumptions** (e.g., "High Detection" vs. "Low Detection") affect the **final risk rating**.







#### D. PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS AND MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS

## **Example of quantitative simulations:**


Instead of assuming **P(FMD Entry)** = **0.96%**, run **10,000 simulations** where customs detection varies between **40%-60%** and analyze the average and confidence intervals.



Beta distribution



Triangular distribution



Uniform distribution

**Example of probability distributions**: If P(B2b) = 40% but could be anywhere from 30%-50%, assign a triangular distribution with:

- Min = 30%
- Most Likely = 40%
- Max = 50%





## Decision making under uncertainty

Once uncertainty is **quantified**, we can apply **decision frameworks**:

- Expected Utility Theory → Weighs risks based on potential economic & health impacts.
- Precautionary Principle → If uncertainty is high, apply stricter controls (e.g., ban high-risk pork sources).
- Cost-Benefit Analysis → Compares the costs of control measures
   vs. potential outbreak losses
- Risk Communication → Ensure that decision-makers understand the uncertainty level in the assessment
- Adaptive Risk Management 

  Update the risk assessment as new data becomes available

# Transparency and documentation

**Clearly document** which assumptions were made and **why**. Specify:

- What data sources were used.
- Where knowledge gaps exist.
- How uncertainty affects the conclusions.

## **Example Application:**

If the **risk of FMD via online pork trade** is "**Moderate**", but **data on swill feeding is missing**, explicitly state:

"Due to limited data on swill feeding practices, the uncertainty level is high, and the risk estimate may change with new information.





## References

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