




Intersectoral Coordination and Collaboration in Response to Animal Health Emergency in Cambodia

Background


- HPAI was first reported in **2004**, in Phoum Pong Peay, Sangkat Phnom Penh Thmey, Khan Tuol Kok, Phnom Penh.
- 71 (confirmed and reported) HPAI/H5N1 outbreaks in birds, including four in wild birds.
- 69 human cases, of which 42 were fatal (~60% are kid<12Ys).
- A novel re-assortant A/H5N1 detected in Cambodia, causing infections in both humans and poultry since October 2023.
- **This virus contains the surface proteins from clade 2.3.2.1c that has circulated locally, but internal genes from a (more recent) clade 2.3.4.4b virus.**



How One Health Established in Cambodia?




HPAI Surveillance in Cambodia



Lessons Learned and Success Stories

- Difficult to identify the source of the outbreak
- Movement of people and poultry/poultry products is complex, particular in the villages with backyard system
- Frequent interaction with middlemen
- Roles of middlemen, poultry transporters/trucks, animal feed and vet drug companies)
- Low reporting of poultry mortality (obligation, to whom...)
- Collaboration between human and animal health sectors (information sharing 115 and hotline 012 214 970)
- Financial contribution to field officers to involve in outbreak investigation and response
- Out of the 12 A/H5N1 (2023-2024) human cases, 5 (42%) were notified as part of SARI surveillance, and 3 (25%) were detected through active case finding
- Prompt investigation, notification, and containment measures conducted by MoH, MAFF, MoE, and public health partners were implemented to address the outbreak effectively
- Joint outbreak investigation of H5N1 outbreak in wild bird protected area by MAFF, MOH, MOE during COVID19
- Outbreak investigation and response have been gradually delegated to subnational level for cost effectiveness and sustainability (**empowerment local response**).

History of Avian and swine Influenza surveillance in Cambodia



Section heading

Challenges/gaps

- Shortage of reagent from time to time
- Compensation policy is not in place
- Poultry sellers/middlemen are reluctant to collaborate with the sampling team due to the sampling frequencies.
- Poultry sellers/middlemen are afraid of AI virus detection in their place which they believed that their businesses are to be interrupted by the authority and the support from customers.
- Identifying the source of poultry is quite impossible while poultry is mixing and the seller and middlemen have little time to answer the questions
- Risk mitigation strategies have not been identified
- Genomic analysis is limited
- Coordination at sub-national levels is limited.

Recommendations /way forward

- HPAIV detected included H5, H7, H9, H14, N1, N2, N3, N4, N6, N8 and N9
- Mostly detected during festive seasons
- Biosecurity at LBMs is a major concern and may pose a risk to highly exposure population including poultry traders and butchers
- Develop National One Health Strategy
- Implement One Health at subnational level
- Develop genomic analysis capacity

Human health – animal health collaboration in avian flu surveillance

