



Introduction to Describing the problem and prioritising hazards.

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
A dark blue, starry night sky with a red arrow pointing to a tiny white dot representing Earth. The word "Perspective" is written in white text above the arrow.

Perspective

There is perhaps no better demonstration of the folly of human conceits than this distant image of our tiny world. To me, it underscores our responsibility to deal more kindly with one another, and to preserve and cherish the pale blue dot, the only home we've ever known.

Carl Sagan.

A common response to risk



Response to risk


- Repeated, poor responses
- Unintended consequences
- Overcoming our primate brains' psychological discomfort and confronting decision-making and uncertainty

September 11's indirect toll: road deaths linked to fearful flyers

German professor estimates an extra 1,595 Americans died in car accidents in year after September 11 attacks



<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/05/september-11-road-deaths> Poor decision-making skills as a species in a crisis

programme  LIVES TOCK RESEARCH INSTITUTE CGIAR

PREVENTING THE NEXT PANDEMIC

Zoonotic diseases and how to break the chain of transmission

DRIVERS OF ZOOONOTIC PANDEMIC RISK

- Agricultural intensification
- Over-exploitation of wildlife
- Urbanization and industry
- Travel and transport
- Demand for animal protein

6 min.

The seven deadly drivers of zoonotic disease pandemics

HOME - THE SEVEN DEADLY DRIVERS OF ZOOONOTIC PANDEMIC RISK



<https://www.ilri.org/news/seven-deadly-drivers-zoonotic-disease-pandemics>

THE LANCET

Submit Article L

HEALTH POLICY | VOLUME 377, ISSUE 9775, P1438-1447, APRIL 23, 2011

Priority actions for the non-communicable disease crisis

Prof Robert Beaglehole, DSc   Prof Ruth Bonita, PhD • Richard Horton, FMedSci • Cary Adams, MBA • George Alleyne, MD • Perviz Asaria, MPH • et al. Show all authors

Published: April 06, 2011 • DOI: [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(11\)60393-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(11)60393-0)

<https://www.thelancet.com/article/S0140-6736%2811%2960393-0/fulltext> systems approach to priority assessment of non communicable diseases in humans

Biodiversity = good for health

- Ecosystem services vs. ecological processes
- Intrinsic value
- Health benefits
- Natural products as medicines


Ecosystem Services:






A

The less bi





Carlson et al 2017



B


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


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Ureta et al 2022




Disease emergence is an ecological process



**Human-induced
environmental
degradation**



**Changes in
interactions
between host,
disease agents, and
their environment**



**Natural selection -
disease agents
adaptations**



**Global transport
of people,
animals, and
goods**



**Severe impacts on
global health,
conservation and
socioeconomics**



Urbanization
Population density



**Poor social and
sanitary conditions**



**Encroaching into new
environments**




**Human-Livestock-Domestic
- Wildlife interactions**



Climate change

One Health – systems thinking



C
k



Data science and modeling






Fig. 2
 Pathogen flow and drivers at the human–livestock–wildlife interface
 The arrows in Figure 2 indicate direct, indirect or vector-borne pathogen flow
 Each box represents a driver for which a case study is provided in the text

neither

Klement RJ (2020) Systems Thinking About SARS-CoV-2. *Front. Public Health* 8:585229. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2020.585229



Risk

Two components:

the **likelihood**, or
probability, of something
happening and, if it does
happen

the **consequences**, of the
deleterious activity




Wildlife Disease Risk Analysis (WDRA)

WDRA - collaborative process to



Those that could
have an **impact**





Those that could be
impacted

Support any disease **management decisions**

Agree on how to best **respond**

WDRA Process Overview and Examples



LEARNING OUTCOMES


This course is designed to equip participants with an understanding of how to put the IUCN Guidelines for Wildlife Disease Risk Analysis into practice.

By the end participants will be able to:


- Recognize and justify situations where a WDRA process can contribute to a) wildlife conservation, b) domestic animal health care, and c) public health protection
- Explain how the principle of One Health and the science of epidemiology are applied to a WDRA
- Design a workshop to effectively engage multiple stakeholders in completing a WDRA

WDRA Step 1

- Outline the **background and context** of the problem
- Identify the **goal, scope, and focus** of the WDRA
- Formulate the DRA **question(s)**
- State assumptions and limitations
- Specify the acceptable level of risk



Prioritising Risks to prevent disaster





Event: Disease transmission from and between traded wildlife

Wildlife trafficker and trader behaviour

Poor wildlife welfare, poor biosecurity along trade route

Understand stakeholder motivations and mitigate accordingly



FROM FOREST TO FOREIGN MARKET

The story of the orangutan

Value changes along the supply chain*

■ = US\$100

○ = % markup from previous selling point



Note: * The original research uncovered a range of prices at each point in the supply chain. For graphical purposes, the study utilized the upper value for each segment of the supply chain.

Source: Clough and May (2018, pp. 8, 9, 25). © Global Financial Integrity 2018




23 million
trade records



184
Parties to
the Convention



~38,700
species listed in the
CITES Appendices



3.5 MILLION

shipments of CITES-listed species

12,028

species reported in trade

30%


of species traded as wild-sourced

Trade by number of **individuals**:

1.3 BILLION individuals



traded as wild-sourced



477 million orchid hybrids
Phalaenopsis hybrid
Appendix II
0% wild-sourced



4 million stony corals
Acropora species
Appendix II
24% wild-sourced




267 million snowdrops
Galanthus species
Appendix II
69% wild-sourced



5 million brown spectacled caiman
Caiman crocodilus fuscus
Appendix II
0.04% wild-sourced

Trade by **volume**:

5.0 MILLION cubic metres



traded as wild-sourced



1.8 million m³
Mongolian oak
Quercus mongolica
Appendix III
100% wild-sourced



1.1 million m³
African rosewood
Pterocarpus erinaceus
Appendix II
98% wild-sourced



0.9 million m³
Manchurian ash
Fraxinus mandshurica
Appendix III
100% wild-sourced




0.3 million m³
Indian rosewood
Dalbergia latifolia
Appendix II
100% artificially propagated

Trade by **weight**:

279 MILLION kilograms



traded as wild-sourced



52 million kg orchids
Orchidaceae species
Appendix I / II
0.05% wild-sourced



18 million kg Queen conch
Strombus gigas
Appendix II
100% wild-sourced




52 million kg holy wood
Bulnesia sarmientoi
Appendix II
100% wild-sourced



17 million kg stony corals
Scleractinia species
Appendix II
100% wild-sourced

Trade in **parts and derivatives**:

290 MILLION items



traded as wild-sourced



39 million cactus stems
Cactaceae species
Appendix I / II
0.02% wild-sourced



35 million sago palm leaves
Cycas revoluta
Appendix II
0.07% wild-sourced



20 million live sturgeon eggs
Acipenseridae species
Appendix I / II
11% wild-sourced



19 million orchid extract
Orchidaceae species
Appendix I / II
0.01% wild-sourced




17 million aloe stems
Liliaceae species
Appendix I / II
1% wild-sourced



12 million sturgeon caviar
Acipenseridae species
Appendix I / II
0.26% wild-sourced

Box 1. IWT: Drivers and Consequences

The IWT is a global trend phenomenon (Figure 1) due to the attractive prices, the low effort made by poachers to acquire wildlife, and the more lenient legal penalties applied for people involved in this activityⁱⁱ. This criminal network is composed of people from several socioeconomic levels, from local subsistence poachers to transnational organized crime. People from local communities in developing countries highly influence the IWT due to factors such as low income, poverty, and illiteracy [14]. This trend has been observed on the illegal trade of pangolins in Nepal, where the low socioeconomic status of locals associated with the growing demand for this animal, particularly in China, facilitated its trading, directly impacting on its conservation [14]. In popular markets, several wildlife species are in contact with each other before being sold or shipped to other regions, this being a driver for the interspecies transmission of pathogens [2]. A study conducted in Laos assessed the potential transmission of zoonotic pathogens from wildlife traded in local markets, identifying 36 zoonotic agents being potentially transmitted. Increased human-wildlife contact, poor biosafety measures, and high-risk taxa for zoonoses were also accounted as risk factors for the presence and dissemination of pathogens in these markets [2].




Trends in Parasitology

Figure 1. The Main Source and Destination Areas of Endangered Wildlife Species Involved in the Illegal Trade Worldwide^{ii-v}. Europe and Russia are mainly importing areas, but for some animal groups, such as fish (*Anguilla anguilla*) in Europe and wild felines in Russia, exportation is also recorded.


Table 1. Pathogens of Public Health Concern Reported in Wildlife Illegally Traded Worldwide

Pathogen	Wildlife involved	Wildlife products	Trade type	Public health issues	Refs
Viruses					
Simian foamy virus (retrovirus)	Non-human primates	Bushmeat	International	Increase in pathogenicity following cross-species transmission	[11]
Cytomegalovirus (herpesvirus)	Non-human primates	Bushmeat	International	Concern for immunocompromised people	[11]
Lymphocryptovirus (herpesvirus)	Non-human primates	Bushmeat	International	B-cell tumors in immunocompromised individuals	[11]
Bacteria					
<i>Escherichia coli</i>	Birds, duiker	Live animals, bushmeat	National, international	Urinary-tract infection, meningitis, septicemia	[4,12]
<i>Klebsiella pneumoniae</i>	Birds	Live animals	National	Pneumonia, urinary-tract infection, septicemia	[4]
<i>Salmonella enterica</i> serovar Typhimurium	Birds	Live animals	National	Gastrointestinal infection	[4]
<i>Listeria monocytogenes</i>	Pangolin, red hog	Bushmeat	International	Meningitis, septicemia, and abortion in immunocompromised people	[12]
<i>Staphylococcus aureus</i>	Pangolin, duiker, red hog, fish	Smoked fish, bushmeat	International	Osteomyelitis, endocarditis, pneumonia, bacteremia, toxic shock syndrome	[12]
Parasites					
<i>Baylisascaris procyonis</i> (nematode)	Raccoons	Live animals	International	Neurological signs, visceral larva migrans	[7]
<i>Toxocara</i> sp. (nematode)	Raccoons	Live animals	National, international	Neurological signs, visceral larva migrans	[7]
<i>Trichinella</i> spp. (nematode)	Black bear, grizzly bear	Meat products	International	Intestinal, muscle, and neurological clinical signs	[1]
<i>Cryptosporidium</i> spp. (protozoan)	Non-human primates	Live animals	National	Intestinal clinical signs	[15]
<i>Hyalomma aegyptium</i> (tick)	Turtles	Live animals	International	Potential vector of zoonoses (e.g., <i>Borrelia turcica</i> ; Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus)	[3]

Pathogens do not know directions




Every new host encountered is an opportunity for pathogen adaptation




WDRA Step 2

- Identify **all possible health hazards** of concern
- Establish criteria for **ranking the importance** of each hazard within the bounds of the defined problem



An example of an ALL HAZARDS approach.



(Council of Canadian Academies, 2011)

For each selected hazard take into account:



Specific circumstances



Risky activities



Population at risk




Geographical location




Socio-environmental context

KDRA - hazard identification and refinement

- Disease = any disturbance in the health or function of an animal or human
- Hazard identification
91 disease hazards
 - 56 Infectious diseases
 - 35 Non-infectious diseases
- 13 disease hazards identified as requiring detailed risk assessment



KDRA: For each hazard...



- Detailed literature review
- Hazard pathway
- Critical control points
- Risk assessment
- Risk mitigation options
- Recommendations





(c) Limbe Wildlife Centre






If you want to go fast, go
ALONE.

If you want to go far, go
TOGETHER.

WDRA – collaboration, co-ordination, communication to capacity build One Health.
Thank you for your attention



Task 1.

Task	
What question(s) are you trying to answer?	
What is the goal or aim you are trying to achieve?	
What's the scope?	Setting boundaries. E.g. the analysis will be confined to relevant published and unpublished information on disease agent or process X and the population biology of species Y, combined with the input of relevant experts and stakeholders
What's the focus?	E.g. the long-term sustainability of species Y.
What level of risk is acceptable?	

Task 2.

<https://padlet.com/cpsgbrasil/orangutan-wdra-brainstorming-what-are-the-main-drivers-of-disease-gh6hrx2kxr9jkstg>

<https://padlet.com/sunwin401/describing-the-problem-what-are-the-main-drivers-of-disease-gh6hrx2kxr9jkstg>

**Don't forget to discuss and input
ASSUMPTIONS and LIMITATIONS**