

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations WORLD ORGANISATION



Department of Agriculture

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African swine fever

Border and other controls

world organisation for animal HEALTH Protecting animals, preserving our puture

Epidemiology

Factors influencing spread and persistence Physical characteristics:

- Resistant to heat and pH changes
- Susceptible to some disinfectants and gamma irradiation

Affected species:

Exclusive to pigs (Sus scrofa) – domestic and wild



Epidemiology

Factors influencing spread and persistence Transmission

 Direct: contact between sick and healthy animals, or contact with infected carcasses.
Mosquitoes and biting flies are theoretical mechanical agents for transmission (unknown if titres are high enough for transmission under field conditions).



Epidemiology

Factors influencing spread and persistence Transmission

- Indirect: affected products (swill feeding), fomites
- Vector: Ornithodoros ticks O. erraticus for domestic pigs. Unknown if other O. spp. could be vectors in Australian conditions



Trans-boundary spread

Movement of wild pigs across contiguous borders

- Natural movements
- Movements facilitated by humans

Feeding of imported infected meat/meat products

- Swill feeding is key risk in many countries
- Swill feeding is illegal in Australia, but can still occur.



Trans-boundary spread

Transmission via other infected/contaminated material

- Contaminated pig feed, fertilisers
- Infected biological products medications/vaccines



National spread

Spread between commercial farms/slaughterhouses

- Movement/trade of infected pigs
- Asymptomatic pigs increasing reports of pigs surviving the disease but still shedding virus for some time



National spread

Spread between wild and domestic animals

- Direct contact between wild and domestic animals
- Swill feeding (material from wild boar included in swill)
- Objects/fomites (employees and contractors inadvertently moving virus into commercial facilities)



Imported pig feed

- Contaminated materials pose biosecurity risk
- Direct pathway entry of exotic animal disease
 - Example: Porcine epidemic diarrhoea in the feedbags



Imported pig feed

Import Conditions for Pig Feed

- Animal derived stockfeed is not permitted Unacceptable risks
- Plant derived stockfeed
 - Subject to risk assessment



Imported Pig Feed

Import Conditions for Pig Feed

- Purified amino acids and vitamins (stockfeed additives)
 - Import permit may not be required
 - highly processed and non-animal sources, but
 - high volume, high exposure, difficult to verify purity without testing







WTO – rights and obligations of Members to set appropriate levels of sanitary protection (Appropriate Level of Protection) in trade as prescribed in SPS Agreement.

CANNOT BE ZERO RISK



ALOP

Measures are developed to achieve the national ALOP – set at very low but not zero.

Options set by OIE Code – either follow existing recommendations for ASF or perform Risk Assessment as prescribed in OIE Code as basis for development of more stringent measures



Department of Agriculture involved in following activities:

- Monitoring ASF situation overseas
- Review of import pathways
- Communication and raising awareness
- Preparedness and post-border activities
- Border activities
 - Including ASF testing of seized products



Monitoring ASF situation overseas

- Monitor new or recurring outbreaks overseas
- Where necessary, impose risk management measures on affected commodities from affected countries



Review of import pathways

- Examination of import conditions for a large number of commodities, to confirm they include measures to address the risk of ASF
- Most cases existing import controls are adequate



Review of import pathways

- As a result, some import conditions have been modified:
 - Enhanced import requirements for baked pig ears and rawhide chews
 - Suspended imports of personal consignments of pork jerky



Border activities

- Screening of mail, cargo and passengers entering Australia
 - Increased screening targeting high-risk pathways
- Heightened passenger inspections
- Surveillance/testing of non-permitted products seized at the border



Preparedness and post-border activities

- Emergency response plan, in case of incursions (AUSVETPLAN)
- Identifying research gaps
- Increase national surveillance and laboratory capacity



Preparedness and post-border activities

- Capacity building with neighbouring countries
- Invest in global activities to develop a vaccine
- Harmonise State/Territory regulatory frameworks



Communications and awareness – industry partnerships

- Pig owners reiterating the dangers of swill feeding
- Importers providing advice on import requirements



Communications and awareness

- Travellers encouraging incoming passengers to avoid bringing porcine products to Australia, or if they do, to declare them on arrival.
- Veterinarians raising awareness of the disease and reporting requirements



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